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1 Introduction
Over the last 60 years, the world has become substantially more integrated while, at the same
time, several non-democratic countries have embarked upon a process of democratization.
Are these phenomena related? Can trade and, more generally, economic integration foster
democracy and favour institutional change? Economists have long been interested in these
questions, but the existing empirical evidence is at best mixed.1 Indeed, a sounder under-
standing of the relationship between economic integration and democracy is important not
only in its own right, but also in light of the recent literature documenting a positive effect
of democratic institutions on growth (e.g. Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005; Papaioannou and
Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2015): if economic openness promotes democratization,
the former can benefit countries not only directly, through the standard “gains from trade”,
but also indirectly, by favouring the emergence of growth-enhancing institutions.
Studying the relationship between economic integration and institutions is particularly
complicated not only because of several econometric difficulties, but also owing to the lack
of unambiguous theoretical predictions. For instance, trade can generate a redistribution of
resources and alter the political equilibrium, but the direction of this change may depend on
the identity of the groups that benefit from trade, and/or on the pre-existing economic and
institutional environment (see Acemoglu et al., 2005 and Puga and Trefler, 2014). Moreover,
when the institutions of trade partners are sufficiently similar, trade may induce countries to
engage in a “race to the top” to appropriate the gains from specialization in institutionally
intensive goods (see Levchenko, 2007).2
Since the seminal work by Grossman and Helpman (1991), another robust finding in the
literature is that the trade-induced spread of ideas can foster economic growth.3 However,
there has not been a systematic analysis of whether economic integration can also favour
a process of cultural transmission that promotes institutional change. A related question
1For instance, Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) find a negative relationship between trade openness and democ-
racy, whereas Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner (2008) estimate a positive and sizeable one.
2For the role that institutions play in shaping the pattern of comparative advantage (and thus of trade)
across countries, see, among others, Nunn (2007) and Costinot (2009).
3See, for instance, the recent works by Alvarez et al. (2013) and Sampson (2016). Grossman and Helpman
(2015) present a more complete discussion on this topic.
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is whether learning (if any) occurs faster for countries with weaker initial institutions that
are further away from a sort of “Democratic Frontier”. On the one hand, countries where
institutions are less developed may have more to learn from their (democratic) partners. On
the other hand, however, the ruling elites in these countries may be in a better position to
resist the pressure of the citizens, and it may thus take longer for democracy to emerge.
In our paper, we study empirically if, and through which channels, economic integration
fosters democracy, by using a large panel dataset of countries over the period 1950-2014. To
address endogeneity concerns, we rely on an instrumental variable (IV) approach that, as
in Feyrer (2009), exploits the rise in the importance of air, relative to sea, transportation
over the last 60 years (see Hummels, 2007). In particular, actual trade is instrumented with
predicted trade obtained from a time-varying gravity equation estimated by modelling the
bilateral resistance term as a function of both sea and air distances between countries, and
allowing the elasticity of trade with respect to such distances to change over time.4 The
time-varying nature of the resulting IV allows to control for year and country fixed effects
in the regression of interest, strengthening the causal interpretation advanced in our work.
We find that economic integration has a positive and significant impact on democracy.
This effect is driven by trade with democratic partners, and accumulates over time. We
test the robustness of our results by using alternative specifications and by performing a
number of checks to mitigate concerns that our instrument is capturing common trends
of less developed countries towards democratization. Moreover, to deal with the highly
persistent nature of institutions, we repeat the analysis using a dynamic panel model.
Next, we investigate the channels through which economic integration can affect the
democratization process. Our evidence paints a picture consistent with a cultural ex-
change/learning channel whereby economic openness promotes democracy through the spread
of ideas from more to less democratic countries. Our interpretation is that, through economic
integration, citizens of autocratic countries get to know democracy and, more broadly, the
institutions of their partners. As a result, demand for more inclusive institutions increases,
4Feyrer (2009) uses this approach to investigate the effect of trade on growth, while we study the rela-
tionship between economic integration and democracy.
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inducing ruling groups to extend franchise.5
We corroborate this interpretation in two ways. First, we provide evidence against al-
ternative mechanisms, such as income effects, human capital acquisition, and trade-induced
changes in inequality. Second, we show that the positive effect of economic integration on
democracy is stronger for countries with lower levels of infrastructural development and
institutional quality at baseline. These findings are supportive of the learning channel men-
tioned above: over the last 60 years, (former) peripheral countries and emerging markets
have become much more integrated to the rest of the world. At the same time, the learning
process is arguably stronger for those countries where the institutional set up is weaker, as
they have more room to learn from their democratic partners.
Our results speak to several strands of the literature. First, they are related both to the
emerging literature on the relationship between culture and institutions (see Alesina and
Giuliano, 2015, for a review) and to the literature on institutional change and regime switch
(see, among others, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Second, our findings are consistent with
works that emphasise the importance of learning for policy adoption (see, among others,
Buera et al., 2011) and for growth (e.g. Alvarez et al., 2013; Sampson, 2016). We contribute
to this literature by showing that learning may involve institutions, and not only policies,
and by presenting suggestive evidence that trade can be a mediating factor that favours
cultural transmission.6
Third, our results complement the works by Nunn (2007) and Costinot (2009) by showing
that not only institutions shape the pattern of international trade by providing a source of
comparative advantage, but also trade itself can promote institutional change, as discussed in
Levchenko (2007).7 While the positive effect of economic openness on democracy is consistent
with findings in Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner (2008), we improve upon their analysis in at
5An alternative hypothesis could be that elites of autocratic countries learn from their partners and
spontaneously change institutions. We are less inclined to believe in this view of efficient institutions.
6In this respect, we also complement Guiso et al. (2009) by showing that, besides the impact that cultural
distance can have on the propensity of countries to trade with each other, trade itself can favour the process
of cultural exchange.
7More precisely, in Levchenko (2007) trade favours institutional development by inducing countries to
engage in a “race to the top”, in order to improve their domestic institutions. Instead, our findings suggest
that institutions can improve (also) as a result of cross-country learning.
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least two ways. On the one hand, differently from their repeated cross-sections, we estimate
panel data models that systematically control for country fixed effects.8 On the other, we
show that economic integration can have substantially different effects on the process of
democratization according to the institutions of trade partners, and we provide evidence for
(or against) mechanisms that can be driving these findings.
Finally, our paper is related to the vast literature on institutions and economic prosperity.
The recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2015) shows that democracy has a strong, positive effect
on growth.9 If that is the case, our findings suggest that the economic gains from trade can
be greatly amplified by the emergence of welfare enhancing institutions induced by economic
integration.
Our work is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of the IV, lays out
our empirical strategy, and presents the data used in this paper. In Section 3, we report our
main results on the positive effect of economic integration on democracy, and show that the
latter is driven by trade with democratic partners. In this section, we also perform several
robustness checks and repeat our analysis using a dynamic panel model. Section 4 discusses
mechanisms through which economic integration can affect democratization, and provides
suggestive evidence against alternative explanations and in favour of a learning/cultural
transmission channel. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
Empirically identifying the causal effect of economic integration on institutions is particularly
difficult, because of both omitted variable bias and reverse causation issues. On the one hand,
richer countries trade more and are also more likely to be democratic. On the other, as shown
in Nunn (2007) and Costinot (2009), institutions are themselves important determinants of
trade. Related to this, Giuliano et al. (2013) find that democracy has a positive effect on the
8The different source of variation exploited by our instrument allows us to do so. See Section 2.1.
9This result is consistent with Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2008, 2009), and
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008). It should be noted, however, that there is no universal consensus on
the idea that democracy causes growth. In fact, other authors have suggested that human capital and income
accumulation are key drivers of well-functioning democracies (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2007).
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introduction of economic reforms, including trade liberalizations. Similarly, economic and
political liberalizations often occur simultaneously, and it is thus hard to identify the effects
of economic openness on political outcomes (see Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005).
One way to overcome endogeneity issues is to exploit exogenous variation induced by
historical events, as in Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Puga and Trefler (2014). However, the
number of episodes that can be used to estimate the causal effect of trade on democracy is
limited. Moreover, at the time most of them occurred, only a small fraction of the world was
democratic, and few countries had modern institutions in place. For this reason, historical
episodes may fail to identify the trade-induced process of democratization resulting from
gradual cross-country learning. Motivated by this discussion, rather than relying on historical
sources of variation, we investigate the relationship between trade and democracy using an
IV approach that we now describe.
2.1 Construction of the Instrument
Hummels (2007) shows that, over the last 60 years, technological change and the advent of air
transportation have substantially altered the structure of international trade. In particular,
the importance of air, relative to sea, transportation has increased dramatically. Moreover, as
discussed also in Feyrer (2009), technological improvements in international transportation
are shared worldwide and are arguably exogenous to the evolution of the economic and
political environment of any individual country. At the same time, they affect different
country-pairs differently, according to their geographic location: for instance, a relative
improvement in air vis a` vis sea transportation should result in a larger increase in trade
flows between Japan and France than between Japan and China. This provides us with an
arguably exogenous source of variation over time at the country-pair level, which we are
going to exploit.10
Consistently with the aforementioned idea, we estimate a gravity equation that includes
both air and sea distance between each country-pair, as in Feyrer (2009). By allowing the
elasticity of trade with respect to these two distances to change over time, we capture the
10See Feyrer (2009) for a more detailed discussion on this source of variation and its exogeneity.
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evolution of their relative importance for bilateral trade between any two countries. A similar
approach, even though in a different context, is also used in Pascali (forthcoming), who takes
advantage of the fact that the introduction of the steamship in the 1870s differently affected
the time and the costs of different routes (previously determined by wind patterns). Relative
to the previous literature (e.g. Frankel and Romer, 1999), these strategies allow to construct
a time-varying instrument that, in turn, makes it possible to control for time and country
fixed effects in our regression of interest, strengthening any causality argument based on
cross-country, panel analyses.
As in the first two aforementioned papers, we estimate bilateral trade flows starting from
a gravity equation based on Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Importantly, we are not
interested in identifying the causal effect of distance on trade, but rather to capture the
change in the correlation between the latter and two different distances (i.e. sea and air)
over time. For this reason, the exact specification we estimate differs from the canonical
gravity model proposed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).
Following Feyrer (2009), we model the bilateral resistance term, τijt, as a function of sea
and air distances. In particular, we assume the following functional form for τijt:
11
ln (τijt) = β
sea
q ln (seadistij) + β
air
q ln (airdistij) , (1)
where seadistij and airdistij are the distance by sea and air, respectively, between countries i
and j. Importantly, coefficients on distances in expression (1) are allowed to vary across time-
periods q, capturing the differential effect over time of technological change in air relative
to sea transportation discussed above. We allow q to have a frequency lower than t, since
improvements in technology may take time to be developed and introduced.
The exact specification of the gravity equation used to predict bilateral trade flows be-
tween countries i and j at time t is:
ln (tradeijt) = χij + ϕit + ψjt + β
sea
q ln (seadistij) + β
air
q ln (airdistij) + uijt. (2)
11The same assumption is made also in Pascali (forthcoming), even though with respect to sail versus
steamship distances, rather than sea versus air.
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A few remarks are in order. First, consistently with Feyrer (2009) and Pascali (forthcom-
ing), coefficients for air and sea distance are allowed to vary at 5-year intervals q. Second, the
pair fixed effects χij control for bilateral (time invariant) characteristics between countries
i and j, such as common language, colonial relationship, and common border, which have
been shown to be important in predicting bilateral trade flows.12
Third, we include country-year fixed effects ϕit and ψjt in (2) and (3). We do so for
two reasons. On the one hand, this is consistent with the gravity equation specification of
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), which includes country-time determinants of bilateral
trade (notably, measures of countries’ economic size). On the other hand, ϕit and ψjt absorb
any country-time specific variation that may affect bilateral trade and confound the effect
of geographic distance.13 Indeed, the exogenous variation we want to capture works at the
pair-time level (Japan-France versus Japan-China in our previous example), going above
and beyond any country-time level effect (say, any Japan-specific change occurring during
our sample period with an effect on trade and correlated with transportation technological
change).14 In this respect, we improve upon Feyrer (2009), who does not control for these
fixed effects, and Pascali (forthcoming), who presents results for a gravity specification with
country-year fixed effects only as a robustness check, but then does not use them to construct
his instrumental variables.
Our instrument, i.e. predicted trade for each country i at time t, is obtained by taking
the exponential of predicted bilateral log trade flows from (2), and summing these over all
12As a robustness check, we also derive our instrument from a specification of (2) that replaces χij with
a vector xij including those three variables, namely
ln (tradeijt) = ϕit + ψjt + β
sea
q ln (seadistij) + β
air
q ln (airdistij) + x
′
ijφ+ vijt. (3)
Our main results are unaffected, as shown in Table A4.
13For instance, the usual measures of country size included in gravity equations (e.g. GDP or population)
or any other time-varying, country-specific characteristic with an impact on trade flows and correlated with
the adoption and use of new transportation technologies.
14Controlling for this battery of fixed effects is consistent with the suggestions in Baldwin and Taglioni
(2007) and Head and Mayer (2014). We follow Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) also in computing log(tradeijt)
as the mean of the log of the two flows between i and j (instead of the log of the mean), and by leaving trade
in current $US, while controlling for time fixed-effects (instead of deflating by the US CPI, as it is common).
Note that the time fixed-effects are absorbed by ϕit and ψjt.
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partners j 6= i. In formulas:
t̂radeit =
∑
j 6=i
ωij exp ̂(ln tradeijt)
=
∑
j 6=i
ωij
[
eβˆ
sea
q (ln seadistij)+βˆ
air
q (ln airdistij)
]
(4)
Differently from Feyrer (2009), and consistently with Pascali (forthcoming), we do not include
the estimated fixed effects in predicted bilateral trade, so as to increase our confidence that
the instrument is indeed capturing only the change in the importance of air relative to sea
transportation, i.e. the desired exogenous source of variation.
As it is common in the literature, observations are weighted in order to improve the
precision of the instrument. Specifically, ωij is the time average of bilateral trade shares
between countries i and j. Importantly, our main results are robust to constructing the
instrument without any weights (see Table 3, column 4).
Finally, note that we implement the procedure described above in order to obtain a
country-specific, time varying IV for trade that is arguably exogenous to the economic and
political environment of each individual country. It is not the first stage of the two stages
least squares (2SLS) estimation method adopted throughout our paper.
2.1.1 Instrument Validity and the Exclusion Restriction
The idea of instrumenting actual trade with predicted trade derived from a gravity equation
goes back at least to Frankel and Romer (1999), who used it in a cross-sectional study of the
effect of trade on income. Other scholars have tried to make this strategy dynamic, either
by re-estimating the gravity equation at different points in time (e.g. Lo´pez-Co´rdova and
Meissner, 2008), or by pooling data for different years and including the estimated time-
effects and time-varying regressors in the construction of the IV, so as to obtain variation
over time (e.g. Alesina et al., 2016). However, a measure of predicted trade derived from
a single distance (e.g. great circles) and non-geographic variables may be confounded by
factors that are not entirely exogenous to the outcomes of interest. In this respect, our
strategy improves upon previous works by constructing predicted trade relying only on the
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desired source of variation, as in Pascali (forthcoming).
As discussed above, our measure of predicted trade exploits variation that is arguably
exogenous to any single country. Also, throughout our work, we show that the instrument
is reasonably strong. However, some concerns remain that our IV may not be completely
excludable from a regression of democracy on trade (equation (5) below). Specifically, our
instrument may be capturing not only the effect of trade (in goods) per se, but also that of
migration flows, FDIs, and ideas. Indeed, with the improvements in air transportation, not
only goods, but also people and ideas are transferred more easily from one country to another,
and these may, in turn, affect democracy and institutions. For this reason, throughout
our work we interpret our results as the effect of economic integration/globalization on
democracy, and not only that of, strictly speaking, trade. Yet, FDIs, migration, and flows
of ideas can also be considered “trade”, to some extent. Thus, whenever we use the word
trade in talking about our findings, we always refer to this broader definition.
2.2 Relation Between Economic Integration and Democracy
The measure of predicted trade constructed above is used as an instrument for actual trade
when estimating the following expression:
democracyit = γi + λt + β log (integrationit) + x
′
itδ + εit (5)
where democracyit is the 21-level Polity2 democracy score from the Polity IV project,
integrationit is measured as the ratio of trade over GDP (in country i at time t), γi and
λt are country and time fixed effects, and xit is a vector of time varying controls that we
include in some specifications (see Section 2.3 for the precise definition of our variables and
Section 3 for details on the controls).15
Due to the highly persistent nature of democracy, and in order to account for the gradual
diffusion of new transportation technologies (the key source of variation behind our IV), all
15Trade is divided by GDP in order to better appreciate the “trade intensity” and, ultimately, the level
of economic integration of a country, with respect to its “economic size”. We acknowledge that GDP might
be endogenous, and it is probably itself influenced by trade. For this reason, we also estimated (5) and (6)
dividing trade by GDP lagged 5 years. Results remained consistent.
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equations are estimated using data at 5-year intervals.16 To assess the robustness of our
results, we also repeat the analysis including lags for democracy on the right hand side in a
dynamic panel model (see Section 3.4).
To provide evidence for our main result, i.e. that what matters for democratization is
integration with democratic partners, we estimate a version of (5) that allows integration
with democratic and non-democratic partners to have a differential effect on democracy,
namely:
democracyit = γi + λt + β
demo log
(
integrdemoit
)
+ βauto log
(
integrautoit
)
+ x′itδ + εit (6)
where integrgit refers to trade (scaled by GDP) conducted by country i with partners with in-
stitutional regime g at time t. If economic openness fosters a process of cultural transmission
and institutional learning, the coefficient on integration with democracies, βdemo, should be
positive and significant, while that on integration with autocracies, βauto, should be insignif-
icant (and/or negative). Note that there are two endogenous regressors in expression (6),
i.e. integrdemoit and integr
auto
it . We instrument them by using two different IVs, constructed
as in Section 2.1, with the only difference that the summation in (4) is conducted separately
for democratic and non-democratic partners.
When estimating (6), we expose ourselves to the Manski reflection problem, since the
choice of trade partners is likely endogenous in our setting. As a matter of fact, it is possible
that countries start to trade more with democracies precisely when becoming more demo-
cratic. Specifically, expression (6) may suffer from endogeneity from two separate sources:
the actual amount of trade flows, and the choice of trade partners. While our measure of
predicted trade deals with the first, it does not address the second. In order to mitigate the
latter concern, in constructing our instrument, we define as democratic (resp. autocratic)
those partners that were democratic (resp. autocratic) 5 years before. All other remaining
concerns related to our estimation strategy, and the way in which we deal with them, are
discussed when presenting our results.
16As in Acemoglu et al. (2008), rather than averaging the data over 5-year periods, we prefer to use
observations every 5 years, from 1950 to 2010, in order to reduce concerns related to serial correlation.
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2.3 Data
Our final dataset is an unbalanced panel of 116 countries over the time span 1950-2014.
Details on variable sources and definitions can be found in Table A1. Summary statistics for
the most important variables are presented in Table 1. In addition, we report the exact list
of country-periods used in our analysis in Table A7. In this subsection, we briefly describe
only our main variables of interest.
We measure democracy with the Polity2 score calculated within the Polity IV project.
This variable takes on integer values between -10 (full autocracy) and 10 (full democracy).
In Table 3, we test the robustness of our main results using a dichotomous 0-1 version of
Polity2, namely dpolity ≡ 1(Polity2 > 0), and another dummy variable constructed from
Freedom House data, namely demo fh ≡ 1(Freedom Rating ≥ 4).17
Bilateral trade flows are obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. For each
exporter-importer pair, in each year, there are potentially four measures of trade, namely
exports and imports reported by both countries. To estimate the gravity equation and derive
total trade of country i at time t, we follow the literature in considering the average of these
four (see Table A1 for details).
Air distance between each pair of countries is based on the great circle distances between
the most important cities in a country reported in the CEPII dataset (see Mayer and Zignago,
2011). This same source also provides data on whether any two countries: i) share a common
border; ii) speak a common language; and iii) have ever been or currently are in a colonial
relationship. These variables are included in the gravity specification (3).
Sea distances were calculated by first identifying the main commercial port for each
country, and then collecting data on the sea-routes between ports of each pair of countries
from the website vesseldistance.org.18 As in Feyrer (2009), landlocked countries are excluded
from our analysis, as the construction of the sea distance was not possible for them.
17Freedom Rating is the mean of the variables Political Rights and Civil Liberty, both measured on a 1-7
scale, with 7 corresponding to highest level of freedom.
18Given the particular geography of the US and Canada, we computed the sea distance between these two
countries and the rest of the world as the shortest sea-route from the main port on either the East or the
West coast. A similar strategy is used for Russia, in this case considering three ports (on the Baltic sea,
Black Sea, and Pacific Ocean).
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GDP and population data come from the Penn World Table, version 9.0. In Section 4,
we also use data on human capital from Barro and Lee (2013), the number of telephone lines
per 100 people from the World Bank (World Development Indicators), the index of ethnic
polarization from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), and the presence of state religion
from Barro and McCleary (2005). Finally, in some regressions, we use data on the number
of minerals from Parker (1997) and on sector-specific value added from the World Bank.
3 Main Results
We now turn to the description of our results. Section 3.1 presents the estimates of the gravity
equation. Next, we study the relationship between economic integration and democracy in
Section 3.2, and perform a number of robustness checks in Section 3.3. Finally, in Section
3.4, we show a dynamic panel version of our results.
3.1 Gravity Step
Figure 1 and column 1 in Table A2 report the estimated coefficients for the gravity equation
(2). They show that the importance of air distance has increased throughout our sample
period: the elasticity of bilateral trade flows to air distance has grown more and more
negative over time, ceteris paribus. On the contrary, the estimated elasticity of trade to sea
distance has remained fairly stable over the last 60 years. A similar pattern, especially for
air distance, emerges also from Figure A1 and column 2 of Table A2, which present results
for specification (3).19
These trends are consistent with findings in Hummels (2007), who shows that the cost
of air transportation fell dramatically between the mid 1950s and the mid 1970s because
of technological progress (notably, the diffusion of the jet engine), and kept declining at a
slower pace afterwards. At the same time, Hummels presents evidence that the reduction
in ocean shipping costs was not as pronounced as the decline in air freight. This provides
support to Feyrer’s (and our) IV strategy.
19Air and sea coefficients for specification (2) should be interpreted as changes relative to those estimated
for 1950, which are dropped to avoid perfect multicollinearity. This drop is instead not needed in (3).
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3.2 Economic Integration and Democracy
We first study the effect of economic integration on democracy by estimating equation (5).
Results are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. Both OLS and 2SLS coefficients (columns
1 and 2 of Panel A, respectively) are positive, with the latter larger in magnitude but less
precisely estimated.20 Unless differently specified, standard errors throughout the paper are
adjusted to take into account the fact that the IVs themselves have been estimated.21 While
these findings may suggest a positive and significant homogeneous relationship between inte-
gration and democracy, their statistical significance is not stable across various specifications
and checks, including the reduced form coefficient in column 1 of Table A3. Several explana-
tions exist for this lack of robustness. On the one hand, it is consistent with the ambiguous
theoretical predictions discussed in the introduction. On the other, it may arise because
economic integration has heterogeneous effects on democracy, depending on the institutions
of trade partners.
In what follows, we focus our attention on the second possibility and estimate equation
(6), where we allow economic integration with democratic and non-democratic partners to
have different effects on institutional change. Results for our preferred specification are
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 (Panel A), for OLS and 2SLS respectively. The
corresponding first stage estimates are shown separately for each endogenous regressor in
Panels C and D, and depicted graphically in Figure 2. At the bottom of each first stage
panel, we report Angrist and Pischke (AP) F-statistics to separately test the strength of each
IV. The Kleibergen-Paap (KP) statistics is presented in the last row of Panel A, to jointly
test for weak IVs.22 In all cases, the evidence provided by the aforementioned statistics
suggests that predicted trade with democracies and autocracies is strongly correlated with
20First stage results (reported in Panel B, column 2) and the F-stat for weak instruments (bottom row of
Panel A) suggest that the instrument is strong.
21In particular, we follow the numerical strategy detailed in footnote 15 in Frankel and Romer (1999) and
in footnote 15 in Pascali (forthcoming).
22Since critical values for the KP statistics have not been tabulated, Bazzi and Clemens (2013) suggest to
report KP together with Cragg-Donald (CD) statistics (which refer to the case of iid errors), and compare
both to the critical values of the latter, reported in Stock and Yogo (2005). For column 4 of Table 2, the CD
statistics is 52.3 and the critical value for a 5% test with maximal size of 15% for our case of two endogenous
variables and two IVs is 4.58, hence way smaller than all our F-statistics.
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its actual trade counterpart.
2SLS estimates in Panel A, column 4, show that economic integration with democratic
partners has a positive and significant effect on democracy, while the impact of economic
integration with autocracies is not statistically different from zero. The point estimate
of 3.414 for βdemo implies that, if a country doubles its trade over GDP with democratic
partners over a 5-year period, its Polity2 score is predicted to increase by about 3 points,
ceteris paribus. As a matter of comparison, this amounts to the difference in the 2014’s
score of Tunisia with respect to Western European countries. Considering that the level of
integration with democracies more than doubled at least once for about a quarter of the
countries in our samples (e.g. Mozambique between 1985 and 1990; Poland between 1970
and 1975; South Korea between 1960 and 1965), the implied magnitudes of estimates in
column 4 are economically significant. Moreover, as shown in Section 3.4, this effect tends to
accumulate over time, becoming substantially larger in the long run. 2SLS results are further
corroborated by reduce-form estimates, reported in Table A3 (column 2) and in Figure 3.
3.2.1 OLS versus IV: Investigating the Validity of the Instrument
2SLS estimates in Table 2 are about two times larger than their corresponding OLS. While
the first stage and F-statistics reassure us about the strength of our IVs, concerns may arise
on their validity and, in particular, on the exclusion restriction. Specifically, it is hard to
attribute the difference mentioned above only to OLS bias since, if anything, one would
expect OLS to be upward, and not downward biased.23
One possible explanation for the discrepancy we find is the presence of measurement error
in trade data, that may lead to attenuation bias of OLS coefficients. A second possibility is
that, as already discussed in Section 2.1.1, our instrument may not be identifying the effect
of trade in goods per se but, more broadly, that of economic integration and globalization.
Both explanations seem compelling, and none of them would threaten the validity of our
estimates.
23The existing evidence (e.g Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) shows that political liberalizations are often
conducive to economic liberalizations. Also, findings in Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007), and Costinot (2009)
suggest that, if anything, OLS estimates should be upward biased.
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However, there exist other, possibly more problematic, reasons for the gap between OLS
and 2SLS estimates documented in Table 2. First, there is evidence that democratization
waves (e.g. the Arab Spring) often affect several countries in a certain area simultaneously
and rather independently from their specific economic conditions (see the discussion in Ace-
moglu et al., 2015). Since predicted trade is a function of the distance between countries,
our instrument may confound the effect of economic integration with that of these waves.
To deal with this issue, in column 5 of Table 2, we control for demo wave, the share
of democracies in each country’s “influence set”. This variable is constructed following
Acemoglu et al. (2015), who use it to operationalise the concept of democratization waves (see
their paper for more details). In a nutshell, the world is first divided in six geographic regions.
Then, within those regions, countries are split in two subgroups, according to their initial
institutions (democracy if Polity2> 0, autocracy if Polity2≤ 0). Each country is assumed
to be (potentially) affected by democratizations occurring only within its “influence set” Si,
made up of countries: i) in its region and ii) with its same initial institutions (excluding
country i itself). Our control is obtained as
demo waveit =
1
|Si|
∑
j∈Si
dpolityjt (7)
where dpolityjt is a dichotomous version of Polity2 (see Section 2.3).
24 Notably, we are not
interested in estimating the causal effect of demo wave, as the “Manski reflection problem”
prevents us from doing so (see Angrist, 2014). Yet, controlling for demo wave is an indirect
way to check whether the exclusion restriction is violated, and our IVs are picking up (at
least in part) variation unrelated to economic integration. As one can see from column 5,
results are fully robust to the inclusion of this control. First stages (column 5 in Panels C
and D in Table 2) and reduced form estimates (column 3 in Table A3) are also virtually
unaltered.
A second concern, related to the previous one, is that our estimates may be capturing
trends specific to some groups of countries that have simultaneously become more integrated
24To mitigate endogeneity concerns, throughout the paper we use a version of demo wave where the
summation in (7) is done over dpolity lagged one year. Results are robust to the contemporaneous measure
or the 5-year lag, and to the use of the absolute number instead of the share.
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and more democratic, for reasons other than trade with democracies. We try to address this
concern by separately including an interaction between year dummies and dummies for being:
i) a non-OECD country; and ii) non-democratic at baseline.25 Results for these exercises
are reported in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2, respectively. While the magnitude of βˆdemo is
somewhat smaller, especially in column 7, the effect of economic integration with democracies
is positive and significant, as in our baseline specification (column 4). Again, first stages and
reduced form estimates are essentially unchanged.
3.3 Robustness
We test the robustness of our findings in a number of ways, reporting results in Table 3.
Column 1 reproduces our baseline specification (column 4 of Table 2), to ease comparisons.
As a first check, we explore whether our estimates are unduly affected by outliers. In
particular, we replicate the analysis in column 1 after removing from the sample all the
observations with a standardised residual in the baseline regression that is larger than 1.96
in absolute value. Column 2 shows that, if anything, the coefficient on integration with
democracies becomes larger and more precisely estimated, while that for integration with
autocracies remains small and not different from zero.
Another concern is that the positive effect we estimate is driven by the peculiar democ-
ratization process experienced by Soviet countries in the early 1990’s, after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. To address that, in column 3, we exclude the ex-USSR countries that
are present in our sample: results are basically unaltered.
Next, column 4 reports results for a version of our instrument obtained without weighting
bilateral predicted trade (see equation (4) and the discussion that follows it). Again, results
remain very similar to those in column 1. The coefficient on integration with democracies is
slightly larger and still significant at the 5% level, while that on integration with autocracies
is not significant. As expected, F-statistics are somewhat lower for this specification, but
they still remain above conventional critical values.
The last two columns of Table 3 present checks with respect to our measure of democracy.
25See also the robustness results to the exclusion of ex-USSR countries that we report in Table 3.
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In column 5, we estimate a linear probability model where the dependent variable is dpolity,
a dichotomous version of Polity2 described in Section 2.3. The rationale of this exercise is
to probe the robustness of our results to the use of a variable that does not capture small
changes in Polity2, which can be quite nosily measured. Estimates, reported in column 5,
show that our results are not affected by the use of this alternative measure.26
Finally, we check that our results are robust to the use of sources for the democracy
measure other than the Polity IV project. In particular, column 6 reports results obtained
using demo fh, a dummy variable for democracy constructed using data from Freedom
House, the other most commonly used data source for democracy measures in the literature
(see Section 2.3 for its precise definition). Also in this case, results remain very similar to
the ones in column 5 and consistent with the ones in column 1.
As a further robustness exercise, we replicate Table 2 using an IV based on the alternative
gravity specification presented in equation (3). Results are reported in Table A4.27 The
positive impact of integration with democracies on democratization is virtually unchanged
in our baseline specification (column 4), and just slightly less significant in columns 5 to 7.
The coefficient on integration with autocracy is not statistically different from zero in any
2SLS estimation.
As a last check, we tried to estimate the gravity equation relying on the Poisson Pseudo
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
However, the very high number of fixed effects in both specifications (2) and (3) prevented
us from obtaining convergence of the maximization algorithm. As a workaround, we decided
to reduce the dimensionality of the problem and estimate simplified versions of (2) and (3)
that include a lower number of fixed effects.28
By simplifying the gravity equation as discussed above, we were able to obtain conver-
gence for the PPML estimators. Table A5 compares results obtained using the PPML and
26When interpreting the magnitude of coefficients in columns 5 and 6, it should be kept in mind that the
scale of the dependent variable is different from the one of Polity2.
27The different number of observations in this sample, compared to the one of Table 2, is due to the fact
that we do not need to drop the baseline period for perfect collinearity. See footnote 19.
28In particular, the simplified version of (2) includes distances and fixed effects for country-pair and time.
The one for (3) includes distances, the same three country-pair specific variables, and fixed effects for origin,
destination, and time.
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the corresponding OLS version of the IVs. Even though we do not want to over-emphasise
these findings (since they are obtained from less theoretically sound gravity specifications),
a reassuring picture emerges. When comparing columns 2 and 3, and columns 5 and 6,
results appear to be fairly consistent: if anything, the effect of integration with democracies
is larger and more precisely estimated when using the PPML-based IVs instead of the OLS-
based ones.29 Instead, results for the effect of economic integration with autocracies are not
sensitive to the strategy used to estimate the gravity equation.
3.4 Dynamic Panel Model
To address possible issues related to the highly persistent nature of institutions, we now
turn to a dynamic panel model that includes (at least) one lag of the democracy score as an
additional regressor in (5) and (6). The specification for total trade becomes:
demoit = γi + λt + β log (integrit) + ρ(demoit−1) + x′itδ + εit (8)
whereas that for trade with democracies and autocracies separately is now:
demoit = γi+λt+β
demo log
(
integrdemoit
)
+βauto log
(
integrautoit
)
+ρ(demoit−1)+x′itδ+εit (9)
where the notation and variables are the same as in previous sections.
Dynamic panel data (DPD) models provide us with an estimate of the long-run effect
of the regressors of interest on the dependent variable.30 In particular, they allow to oper-
ationalise the observation that, because of persistence, the impact on democracy of a rise
in integration in a given period may be amplified over time. Specifically, the cumulative
long-run effect on the dependent variable can be calculated as βˆ
g
1−ρˆ times the initial increase
in integration.
Table 4 presents DPD results. Columns 1 and 4 report a first “naive” estimation of,
29The still high dimensionality of the problem prevented us from applying the standard error numerical
adjustment procedure in column 6.
30Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) are examples of papers that use our same method to
calculate long-run effects.
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respectively, (8) and (9) (always without controls xit) based on a standard within estimator.
The persistence in the democracy score emerges clearly by looking at the positive and sig-
nificant ρˆ. Contemporaneous effects are small and long-run ones (reported in Panel B) are
close to their corresponding OLS estimates in Table 2.
To avoid Nickell (1981) bias, which is likely to be relevant in our short panel with 13
periods, in columns 2 and 5 we repeat the same estimations using the Arellano and Bond
(1991) (AB from now on) GMM estimator. To partial out fixed effects from the model, we
adopt the method of orthogonal deviations suggested in Arellano and Bover (1995). Results
of this exercise show even smaller effects compared to the ones in columns 1 and 4.
The DPD analysis presented so far, however, is based on the questionable assumption of
exogeneity of integrgit. To address this concern, we add our IVs as further external instru-
ments in the AB estimation procedure. Results for our preferred specifications, presented in
columns 3 and 6, are now in line with their analogues in Table 2.31 Estimates in column 6
show once again that there is a sizeable and significant effect of trade with democratic part-
ners on democracy (Panel A), which accumulates over time (Panel B). A long-run estimate
of 7.1 implies that a country doubling its integration with democracies from one period to
the next is predicted to experience a long-run increase in Polity2 of 7 points, ceteris paribus.
This amounts to the 2014’s difference in the democracy score between the US and Turkey.
The effect of trade with autocracies is instead not significant, both in the short and in the
long run.
Robustness checks for these findings are presented in subsequent columns of Table 4.
Columns 7 to 9 replicate in a dynamic setting columns 5 to 7 of Table 2. Column 10 adds
a second lag of the dependent variable as a regressor.32 Results remain broadly consistent
under these alternative specifications, with just a slightly higher (and significant) effect of
integration with autocracies in columns 6 and 7.
Table 4 also reports the number of IVs used in the AB procedure and a number of statis-
tical tests on the validity of the estimators. None of the latter raises particular concerns: the
31Again, we do not focus on the estimates of specification (8), given their lack of robustness.
32The long-run effect in this case of a double lag is computed as βˆ
g
1−ρˆ1−ρˆ2 , where ρˆp is the estimated
coefficient on lag p.
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null hypothesis for the test of the absence of serial correlation in the errors is never rejected
(see AB AR2 p-val in Panel A). Similarly, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions
does not reject the null hypothesis at conventional levels in the specifications of interest.
Finally, finding that ρˆ is always substantially less than 1 is consistent with the stationarity
of the process for Polity2.
4 Mechanisms
In this section, we discuss and provide evidence on the different channels through which
economic integration can affect democratization. We start by arguing that, consistently
with the literature and because of our IV strategy, our findings are unlikely to result from
direct actions of ruling groups (Section 4.1). Then, we show that mechanisms commonly
viewed as conducive to democracy, such as modernization and human capital accumulation
(Section 4.2), or trade-induced changes in inequality (Section 4.3), are unlikely to explain our
main results. Instead, we present suggestive evidence consistent with the learning hypothesis
proposed in our work (Section 4.4).
4.1 The Supply Side
Economic integration can affect the process of democratization through a variety of channels.
The first, important distinction to be drawn is between “supply” and “demand” factors that
can promote or hinder institutional change.33
On the supply side, two possible mechanisms can be at play. First, ruling elites may decide
to simultaneously undertake political and economic liberalizations. Similarly, relatively non-
democratic countries may first adopt more inclusive institutions and then gradually reduce
trade barriers. While consistent with the existing evidence (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005,
and Giuliano et al., 2013), this explanation can be ruled out by our empirical strategy,
that exploits variation in economic integration orthogonal to the aforementioned political
33We refer to supply factors as changes coming only from decisions of the ruling group, keeping fixed the
actions by other groups in the society. Similarly, by demand factors we mean forces that result from decisions
by citizens/non-elite members, keeping fixed the actions of the elites.
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considerations.
Second, because of the transmission of ideas favoured by trade (e.g. Grossman and Help-
man, 1991), the ruling groups may realise that democratic institutions outperform autocratic
ones, and decide to democratise. Yet, the existing literature (both empirical and theoretical)
is not supportive of this “efficient institutions” view: the extension of franchise has rarely
emerged spontaneously. In fact, threats from other groups in the society usually explain
why the ruling elites decide to move towards a more inclusive political system (see, among
others, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
In the next subsections, we turn to the discussion of “demand” factors through which
economic integration can affect democracy.
4.2 Income Effects and Human Capital Accumulation
According to the “modernization hypothesis” originally proposed by Lipset (1959), the eco-
nomic gains from trade may boost demand for democracy either directly, through an increase
in income, or indirectly, by inducing human capital accumulation. In particular, the latter
can favour the process of democratization by enabling citizens to better coordinate their ac-
tions and solve the collective action problem (as discussed, among others, by Glaeser et al.,
2007).34
We start by noting that it is not immediate to reconcile the modernization hypothesis with
the differential effect that we find for trade with democratic and non-democratic partners
(see Tables 2 to 4). Nonetheless, one possible concern is that trade with democracies may
have larger effects on either income growth or incentives to accumulate human capital.35 We
provide evidence that this is unlikely to be happening in our sample.
First, we augment our main specification (6) by controlling for GDP. We acknowledge
that income is a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), as it is likely to be itself affected
34Consistently with this idea, Meyersson (2014) finds a strong, positive effect of human capital accumula-
tion on political participation for women in Turkey.
35Note, however, that in a standard “comparative advantage” framework, less developed countries should
specialise in the production of unskill-intensive goods, in turn reducing (rather than increasing) incentives
to invest in human capital. Indeed, findings in Atkin (2015) and Blanchard and Olney (2015) are consistent
with this idea and our results seem also to confirm this hypothesis.
22
by trade. For this reason, our exercise should be interpreted as providing suggestive, but
not conclusive, evidence. However, we believe that this can be a crude test to check if
income has any direct effect on democracy: if the positive effect of economic integration on
democracy estimated above were solely due to gains from trade, the coefficient on trade in
(6) should become insignificant after including GDP, while that on GDP should be positive
(and significant).
In fact, as shown in Table 5, exactly the opposite happens. In particular, we estimate
(6) including log of real GDP (column 1), log of real GDP and log population (column 2),
and log of real GDP per capita (column 3). The coefficients on trade with democracies
remain large in magnitude and statistically significant, as in Table 2. Also, and importantly,
coefficients on GDP are never statistically significant (with a negative point estimate). As
just noted, one should be careful when interpreting these results, since GDP is likely to be
itself an outcome of trade.36 Yet, Table 5 suggests that (trade-induced) income growth is
unlikely to be driving the “democratizing” effect of economic integration estimated in our
work.
Next, we study if economic integration has a positive effect on human capital accumula-
tion in our sample. To do so, we re-estimate (6) using different measures of human capital
from Barro and Lee (2013) as dependent variables. Results are reported in columns 4 and
5 of Table 5, where we regress, respectively, the fraction of the population with completed
secondary schooling and average years of schooling on trade split between democratic and
non-democratic partners.
In both cases, the coefficient on economic integration with democracies is negative. More-
over, in column 5, the estimated effect of trade with democracies is marginally significant,
suggesting that average years of schooling decline when trading with democratic countries.
While a deeper analysis of the relationship between trade and human capital acquisition goes
beyond the scope of this paper, these findings suggest that the positive effect of economic
integration on democracy is not due to increased human capital.
36These findings are robust to instrumenting income and population with their 5-year lags, and to con-
trolling for the battery of variables included in Table 2.
23
4.3 Trade-Induced Changes in Inequality
Trade can widen the income gap between the elites and the rest of the society, in so doing
rising citizens’ discontent with the status quo and their incentives to push for institutional
change.37 Also, economic openness can alter the political equilibrium by generating a re-
distribution of resources within the society. If groups that are made better off by trade are
also those that are more likely to benefit from democracy (e.g. the middle class and/or
merchants in Acemoglu et al., 2005), institutional change can emerge as a consequence of
economic openness. In general, one may be concerned that the range of goods traded with
democracies differs from that traded with autocracies, leading to inequality dynamics that
depend on trade partners’ institutions. In what follows, we provide evidence against the
possibility that our main findings are unduly driven by these forces.
Specifically, we test whether results reported in Table 2 vary across countries, depending
on characteristics that are likely to influence the pattern of comparative advantage, and thus
the potential redistributional consequences of trade. Specifically, in Table 6, we augment
(6) by interacting integration with democratic and autocratic partners with: i) a dummy
for being an exporter of services (column 1); ii) the fraction of land devoted to agriculture
(column 2); iii) the number of minerals in the country (column 3);38 and iv) value added
from, respectively, industry and agriculture (columns 4 and 5).39
The rationale behind this exercise is the following. If the redistributional consequences
of trade were responsible for the democratizing effect of economic integration estimated in
Table 2, then the coefficient on (at least some of) the interactions should be significant.
Since it is hard to know a-priori the direction of trade-induced changes inequality, we chose
to interact trade with a large number of proxies for patterns of comparative advantage.
37Autor et al. (2016) and Dippel et al. (2015) provide evidence consistent with the idea that trade-induced
changes in inequality can alter the political equilibrium, even in “full democracies”. In particular, these
works show that import competition, and the associated increase in inequality, lead to political polarization
and the rise of more “extremist” parties in, respectively, the US and Germany.
38Similar results are obtained when interacting trade with oil reserves rather than minerals.
39All interacted variables are measured at baseline to limit possible simultaneity bias (due to the effect
of trade on the pattern of specialization). To ease the interpretation of results, those in columns 2 to 5 are
standardised to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1. To save space, estimates for the direct
effect of trade with autocracies and its interaction with variables in (i) to (iv) are not reported in Table 6.
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For instance, rents from natural resources are often largely appropriated by the elites,
especially in less developed economies. If the effect of trade on democracy were due to
citizens’ discontent resulting from increased inequality between the ruling group and the
rest of the population, the coefficient on the interaction between trade and the number of
minerals should be positive and significant.40 Conversely, if economic integration triggers
institutional change by favouring groups other than the elites, then one would expect a
significant coefficient on the interaction with the dummy for being an exporter of services.
In all cases, the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant and very imprecisely
estimated. Also, and importantly, by comparing coefficients across columns, there is no
systematic pattern suggesting that trade-induced changes in inequality may be driving our
results. For example, the coefficient on the interaction with the number of minerals (column
3) is negative, whereas that on the interaction with value added from agriculture (column
5) is positive. While the evidence presented here is somewhat indirect, it nonetheless weighs
against the possibility that our main results are driven by trade-induced changes in inequality
or in the relative economic (and political) power of different groups in the society.
4.4 Suggestive Evidence on the Learning Channel
Finally, demand for democracy can increase with economic integration due to the pres-
ence of a learning/cultural transmission channel. Specifically, as non-democratic countries
are exposed to their democratic partners’ institutions, demand for democracy arises (or
strengthens) if citizens perceive the benefits of a more inclusive political and economic sys-
tem. Similarly, attitudes towards democracy may change, with people becoming more willing
to limit the privileges and the power of the elites. As pressure from the rest of the popu-
lation increases, the ruling group may be forced to extend franchise and broaden political
participation.41 As a result, institutions improve and democracy emerges.
Moreover, as shown by Grossman and Helpman (1991) among others, trade fosters growth
by favouring the transmission of (economic) knowledge across and within countries. Hence,
40A similar reasoning applies to the interaction between trade and value added from agriculture and/or
the fraction of land devoted to agriculture.
41See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for a more complete discussion of this mechanism.
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economic integration can increase the returns to democracy since, in autocratic regimes, the
flow of ideas is usually deliberately restricted by the ruling groups, and this, in turn, is likely
to reduce economic development. Anticipating the higher returns that can be achieved under
democracy, citizens of autocratic countries may have stronger incentives to invest resources
and push for institutional change, ultimately shifting the balance of political power away
from the elites and towards themselves.
Our main finding that the democratizing effect of economic openness is driven by inte-
gration with democratic, rather than autocratic, partners is consistent with the existence of
this institutional learning channel. In what follows, we provide further, suggestive evidence
in favour of this mechanism.
4.4.1 Splitting the Sample
We start by showing that our results are driven by non-OECD members and, more broadly,
by countries that were non-democratic at baseline. On the one hand, these results should
not be surprising, since the Polity2 score of countries that were already democratic in the
1950s has often remained constant, and therefore most of the variation in our sample comes
from less developed countries (LDCs). On the other hand, however, they are consistent with
the existence of a learning channel, as these countries are precisely those that may have more
to learn from their democratic partners.
In practice, we re-estimate expression (6) considering only: i) non-OECD members; ii)
countries whose baseline Polity2 score is strictly positive; iii) years from 1960 (included)
onwards. We report our findings in Table 7, including both OLS and 2SLS results for
each of the three alternative samples considered.When restricting the analysis to non-OECD
countries (columns 1 and 2), the gap between OLS and IV estimates increases, with the
latter becoming larger than for the full sample (see Table 2, column 4).42 Conversely, when
including only countries with baseline Polity2 score strictly positive (columns 3 and 4),
results are no longer significant, with IV coefficients being negative and substantially smaller
than OLS. Finally, when considering only years from 1960 onwards (columns 5 and 6), 2SLS
42A very similar patter of results (not shown for brevity) emerges when focusing on countries with non-
positive baseline Polity2 score.
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estimates are again larger than those shown in Table 2.
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 7 suggests that results are driven by countries
that were non-democratic at baseline. Moreover, the rise in the coefficient of interest after
1960 is consistent with the fact that the relative number of autocracies, i.e. countries for
which economic integration may foster democratization, grows over time in our sample (see
Table A6 in the Appendix).43
4.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects
In this subsection we investigate possible heterogeneous effects by augmenting (6) an inter-
action between economic integration and a number of country-specific variables. In columns
1 to 4 of Table 8, we report results when trade is interacted, respectively, with: i) the base-
line number of telephone lines per 100 people; ii) Polity2 score at baseline; iii) the index
of ethnic polarization from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), standardised to have zero
mean and standard deviation equal to 1; and iv) a dummy indicator for the presence of a
state religion in 1900 from Barro and McCleary (2005).44
In the presence of a learning channel, one would expect countries with lower baseline levels
of institutional and/or economic development to benefit more from economic integration, as
these countries should have more to learn from their (more) democratic partners. That is,
the interaction between trade with democracies and baseline indicators of economic (column
1) and institutional (column 2) development should be negative and significant. Results,
reported in Table 8 (columns 1 and 2), are in line with this hypothesis: economic integration
has a stronger effect on the process of democratization in countries with lower institutional
and infrastructural quality at baseline.
In columns 3 and 4 we indirectly test two additional implications of our proposed learning
mechanism. First, in more ethnically polarised countries, the diffusion of information within
the society should be more limited. Hence, since trade directly affects the perception of
43Consistently with this interpretation, when repeating the analysis considering only years from 1970
onwards and from 1980 onwards, results (not reported for the sake of brevity) become stronger and stronger
over time.
44As in Table 6, results for the direct effect of trade with autocracies and its interaction with variables in
(i) to (iv) are not reported for brevity. Reassuringly, none of these coefficients is significant.
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democracy only for some citizens (i.e. those directly exposed to economic integration),
attitudes towards democratic institutions for the population as a whole should change more
slowly. In turn, demand for institutional change should be less likely to reach the critical
mass needed for democratization.45 Consistently with this idea, the interaction between
trade with democracies and the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) polarization index is
negative and significant (column 3).46
Second, if economic integration promotes institutional change by altering citizens’ percep-
tions of democracy, this effect should be stronger in countries where some forms of restriction
to the flow of information on different institutions has been historically in place. We proxy
for this using a dummy for the presence of a state religion in 1900 (Barro and McCleary,
2005). As shown in column 4, the interaction between the latter variable and trade with
democracies is positive, albeit not statistically significant. We interpret this as suggestive ev-
idence that economic integration may operate as an external force that reduces informational
barriers and makes people aware of institutional arrangements in other countries.
To sum up, while results in Tables 7 and 8 may be consistent with other mechanisms,
they are nonetheless supportive of an institutional learning channel. This interpretation is
reinforced by our findings that modernization and human capital accumulation (Table 5), and
trade-induced changes in inequality (Table 6) are unlikely to account for the democratizing
effect of trade with democracies documented throughout our work.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study if, and through which channels, economic integration can foster
democracy, by instrumenting actual trade with predicted trade obtained from a time-varying
gravity equation. Extending the strategy used in Feyrer (2009), we exploit the fact that air
transportation has become more and more important relative to sea transportation over
the last 60 years (as documented in Hummels, 2007). A time-varying instrument for trade
45Demand-driven institutional change may be slowed down in a more polarised country also because, there,
solving the collective action problem is more costly.
46Similar results, though less precisely estimated, are obtained when considering the index of linguistic
fragmentation of Alesina et al. (2003).
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(or, more broadly, economic integration) permits the inclusion of time and country fixed
effects in the regression of interest, in turn reducing endogeneity concerns that permeate
existing cross-country studies. We test the robustness of our results to the use of alternative
specifications and, to deal with the persistent nature of democracy, we repeat the analysis
using a dynamic panel model.
We find that economic integration has a positive effect on democracy that is driven by
trade with democratic partners, tends to accumulate over time, and is stronger for coun-
tries with lower initial levels of democracy and infrastructural development. Our preferred
interpretation is that demand for democracy increases with economic integration due to the
presence of a learning/cultural transmission channel, whereby less democratic countries learn
from the institutions of their (more) democratic partners. We corroborate this interpretation
by providing evidence against alternative mechanisms, such as income effects, human capital
acquisition, and trade-induced changes in inequality.
Our results provide motivation for future work along several directions. First, it would be
interesting to unveil the exact mechanisms through which the trade-induced learning process
operates. For this, a different empirical setting, with more micro-based evidence on changes
in citizens’ attitudes towards alternative institutional arrangements is needed. Second, in
order to improve upon the reduced-form nature of our results and ask counterfactual ques-
tions, one could develop and estimate a structural learning model that relates trade and
democratization.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Deviation p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 Obs
Polity2 1.727 7.410 -9 -7 4 9 10 1152
dpolity 0.558 0.497 0 0 1 1 1 1152
demo fh 0.557 0.497 0 0 1 1 1 869
integration 0.283 0.681 0.060 0.135 0.202 0.297 0.570 1152
integration demo 0.232 0.584 0.045 0.109 0.170 0.247 0.456 1152
integration auto 0.051 0.139 0.003 0.013 0.025 0.049 0.161 1152
Notes: All statistics are calculated for the sample of Table 2, but from the ones for demo fh,
which refer to the sample of Table 3, column 6. The period covered is 1955-2010 (included), with
observations at 5-year frequency. Polity2 is the democracy score from the Polity IV project. dpolity
is a dichotomous version of Polity2, while demo fh is another dummy variable to measure democracy
based on Freedom House data (see Section 2.3 for details). integration refers to trade over GDP,
considered both together and separately for democratic and autocratic partners. p# refers to the
#th percentile of the sample distribution.
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Table 2: Economic Integration and Democracy: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
PANEL A - OLS and SECOND STAGE: dep var is Polity2
log(integration) 1.146** 2.855*
(0.544) (1.718)
log(integration demo) 1.710*** 3.414** 3.535** 3.219** 2.727**
(0.550) (1.480) (1.382) (1.449) (1.257)
log(integration auto) -0.594** -0.606 -0.107 -0.952 -0.898
(0.270) (0.614) (0.567) (0.595) (0.558)
F-stat for weak IVs 16.783 7.452 8.018 7.980 7.306
PANEL B - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration)
log(pred integration) 0.250***
(0.061)
PANEL C - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration demo)
log(pred integration demo) 0.279*** 0.274*** 0.281*** 0.282***
(0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.060)
log(pred integration auto) -0.016 -0.005 -0.002 -0.022
(0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042)
AP F-stat for log(integration demo) 10.239 10.270 10.209 11.253
PANEL D - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration auto)
log(pred integration demo) -0.314*** -0.317*** -0.316*** -0.314***
(0.098) (0.097) (0.101) (0.096)
log(pred integration auto) 0.525*** 0.533*** 0.531*** 0.523***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.061) (0.056)
AP F-stat for log(integration auto) 51.644 54.049 44.103 50.064
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
Number of countries 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Notes: The dependent variable is reported at the top of each Panel. The main regressor of interest in Panel A is (log) trade over GDP,
considered together in columns 1-2 and separately for democratic and autocratic partners in columns 3-7. Actual trade is instrumented
with predicted trade as described in the main text (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), where democratic (autocratic) partners are defined as
partners with Polity2 score five years before strictly positive (non-positive). Column 5 controls for demo wave. Columns 6 and 7 include
interactions between year dummies and dummies for non-OECD country, and baseline non-democracy, respectively. All regressions are
estimated on 1955-2010 data at 5-year frequency, and include year and country fixed effects. AP F-stat refers to the (robust) F-stat for
the Angrist and Pischke weak identification test for each individual endogenous regressor. The F-stat for weak IVs is the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald rk statistics for (jointly) weak instruments. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, and the ones
for 2SLS and First Stages are corrected to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the bilateral
trade equation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3: Economic Integration and Democracy: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Baseline No Outliers No USSR No Weights dpolity demo fh
PANEL A - SECOND STAGE
log(integration demo) 3.414** 5.374*** 3.435** 4.309** 0.243** 0.252*
(1.480) (1.933) (1.489) (2.133) (0.111) (0.133)
log(integration auto) -0.606 -0.124 -0.605 -0.129 -0.053 -0.041
(0.614) (0.728) (0.613) (0.681) (0.048) (0.056)
F-stat for weak IVs 7.452 4.049 7.344 6.532 7.452 6.140
PANEL B - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration demo)
log(pred integration demo) 0.279*** 0.268*** 0.280*** 0.223** 0.279*** 0.323***
(0.062) (0.076) (0.062) (0.095) (0.062) (0.071)
log(pred integration auto) -0.016 -0.020 -0.016 0.014 -0.016 -0.053
(0.040) (0.046) (0.040) (0.070) (0.040) (0.043)
AP F-stat for log(integration demo) 10.239 6.184 10.161 6.266 10.239 11.472
PANEL C - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration auto)
log(pred integration demo) -0.314*** -0.368*** -0.319*** -0.923*** -0.314*** -0.185**
(0.098) (0.126) (0.098) (0.206) (0.096) (0.085)
log(pred integration auto) 0.525*** 0.565*** 0.526*** 1.094*** 0.525*** 0.485***
(0.055) (0.065) (0.055) (0.163) (0.052) (0.061)
AP F-stat for log(integration auto) 51.644 43.541 52.004 28.850 51.644 34.940
Observations 1,152 1,080 1,128 1,152 1,152 869
Number of countries 116 116 110 116 116 116
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is Polity2 in columns 1-4, dpolity in column 5, and demo fh in column 6. Column 2 drops
observations with a standardised residual in column 1 that is larger than 1.96 in absolute value. Column 3 removes ex-USSR countries
from the sample in column 1. Column 4 is identical to column 1, but from the fact that the IVs are built without any weight in formula
(4). Columns 5 and 6 are identical to column 1, apart from using different dependent variables. The main regressors of interest in
Panel A are (log) trade with democratic and autocratic partners divided by GDP. Actual trade is instrumented with predicted trade
as described in the main text (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), where democratic (autocratic) partners are defined as partners with Polity2
score five years before strictly positive (non-positive). All regressions are estimated on 1955-2010 data at 5-year frequency, and include
country and time fixed effects. AP F-stat refers to the (robust) F-stat for the Angrist and Pischke weak identification test for each
individual endogenous regressor. The F-stat for weak IVs is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk statistics for (jointly) weak instruments.
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, and the ones for 2SLS and First Stages are corrected
to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the bilateral trade equation; *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4: Economic Integration and Democracy: Dynamic Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES OLS GMM GMM OLS GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
PANEL A - DPD: dep var is Polity2
log(integration) 0.598 0.341 3.045***
(0.366) (0.343) (0.968)
log(integration demo) 0.861** 0.376 2.616*** 2.557*** 3.044*** 2.491*** 2.252**
(0.364) (0.320) (0.788) (0.750) (0.875) (0.807) (0.880)
log(integration auto) -0.239 -0.079 0.746* 0.854** 0.710 0.529 0.571
(0.182) (0.173) (0.449) (0.424) (0.436) (0.517) (0.431)
L.polity2 0.510*** 0.692*** 0.653*** 0.500*** 0.697*** 0.632*** 0.566*** 0.604*** 0.555*** 0.605***
(0.047) (0.068) (0.064) (0.048) (0.074) (0.066) (0.072) (0.074) (0.084) (0.069)
L2.polity2 0.084*
(0.050)
p-val lags 3-6 0.391
Number of AB IVs 78 78 79 79 80 90 90 77
External IVs NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES
AB AR2 p-val 0.397 0.383 0.403 0.418 0.491 0.450 0.457 0.985
Hansen p-val 0.0365 0.0816 0.0432 0.122 0.142 0.181 0.241 0.0629
PANEL B - LONG-RUN EFFECTS
L-R effect of integr 1.219 1.107 8.758***
p-value 0.105 0.326 0.005
L-R effect of integr demo 1.721** 1.237 7.124*** 5.903*** 7.700*** 5.609*** 7.270***
p-value 0.016 0.217 0.001 0.0004 0.0005 0.003 0.003
L-R effect of integr auto -0.475 -0.254 2.002 1.946* 1.772 1.167 1.800
p-value 0.178 0.640 0.138 0.0679 0.150 0.359 0.240
Observations 1,099 983 983 1,099 983 983 983 983 983 881
Number of countries 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Notes: The dependent variable is Polity2. The main regressor of interest is (log) trade over GDP, considered together in columns 1-3 and separately for democratic
and autocratic partners in columns 4-10. The long-run effects reported in Panel B are calculated as described in Section 3.4. Columns 1 and 4 report results
obtained from a classical within estimators, while all other columns show results for the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator with orthogonal deviations. In
Columns 3 and 6-10, actual trade is instrumented with predicted trade as described in the main text (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), where democratic (autocratic)
partners are defined as partners with Polity2 score five years before strictly positive (non-positive). Column 7 controls for demo wave. Columns 8 and 9 include
interactions between year dummies and dummies for non-OECD country, and baseline non-democracy, respectively. Column 10 controls for an additional second
lag of Polity2. The p-val lags 3-6 in column 10 is the p-value of the test of null coefficients on lags 3 to 6 of Polity2. All regressions are estimated on 1955-2010
data at 5-year frequency, and include year and country fixed effects. The Number of AB IVs is the number of IVs (exogenous regressors and lags of the dependent
variable) used in deriving the GMM estimates. It does not include the external IVs used in Cols 3 and 6-10. AB AR2 p-value is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test
for serially correlated errors. Hansen p-value is the p-value of the Hansen (robust) tests of over-identifying restrictions. Standard errors (reported in parentheses)
are clustered at the country level, and the ones involving the external IVs are corrected to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated)
parameters of the bilateral trade equation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5: Income Effects and Human Capital Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Polity2 Polity2 Polity2 % Secondary Years of School
log(integration demo) 2.805** 3.181** 2.283** -0.990 -0.997*
(1.192) (1.300) (1.142) (3.588) (0.526)
log(integration auto) -0.675 -1.154* -0.885 -1.738* -0.014
(0.588) (0.695) (0.611) (1.000) (0.140)
log(rGDP) -0.335 -0.528
(0.564) (0.618)
log(population) 2.547
(1.785)
log(rGDP pc) -0.737
(0.625)
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,035 1,035
Number of countries 116 116 116 102 102
F-stat for weak IVs 15.910 16.325 14.959 4.864 4.864
AP F-stat for log(integration demo) 22.697 20.927 23.592 6.999 6.999
AP F-stat for log(integration auto) 45.929 28.088 33.589 49.805 49.805
Notes: In columns 1,2,3, the dependent variable is Polity2, while in columns 4,5, it is, respectively, the fraction of the
population with completed secondary schooling and average years of schooling. The main regressors of interest are (log)
trade with democratic and autocratic partners divided by GDP. In addition, columns 1,2,3 control respectively for log real
GDP, both log real GDP and log population, and log real GDP per capita. Actual trade is instrumented with predicted
trade as described in the main text (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), where democratic (autocratic) partners are defined as
partners with Polity2 score five years before strictly positive (non-positive). All regressions are estimated on 1955-2010
data at 5-year frequency, and include year and country fixed effects. AP F-stat refers to the (robust) F-stat for the Angrist
and Pischke weak identification test for each individual endogenous regressor. The F-stat for weak IVs is the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rk statistics for (jointly) weak instruments. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the
country level and are corrected to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the
bilateral trade equation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Trade-Induced Changes in Inequality and Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
log(integration demo) 3.045* 4.350** 3.115** 0.657 0.941
(1.588) (1.804) (1.362) (1.809) (1.716)
log(integration demo)*1(service exporter) 8.681
(8.222)
log(integration demo)*(Agric. Land) -0.077
(1.250)
log(integration demo)*(Minerals) -1.075
(0.820)
log(integration demo)*(Industry value added) 0.875
(1.364)
log(integration demo)*(Agriculture value added) 1.655
(1.415)
Observations 1,148 1,027 1,152 886 895
Number of countries 115 114 116 112 112
F-stat for weak IV 3.226 2.571 3.932 2.807 4.205
AP F-stat for log(integration demo) 9.676 5.664 5.563 6.950 7.641
AP F-stat for interaction with log(integration demo) 7.308 22.913 6.146 12.381 9.583
Notes: The dependent variable is Polity2. The main regressors of interest are (log) trade with democratic partners divided by GDP and its
interaction with, respectively: i) a dummy for being an exporter of services (column 1); ii) the fraction of land devoted to agriculture (column
2); iii) the number of minerals in the country (column 3); iv) value added from industry (column 4) and agriculture (column 5). All variables in
the interactions are measured at baseline and the ones in columns 2 to 5 are standardised to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1.
Actual trade is instrumented with predicted trade as described in the main text (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2). All regressions always include the
log of trade with autocratic partners divided by GDP and its interaction with variables (i)-(iv) above (coefficients on these variables not shown
for brevity). Democratic (autocratic) partners are defined as partners with Polity2 score five years before strictly positive (non-positive). All
regressions are estimated on 1955-2010 data at 5-year frequency, and include year and country fixed effects. AP F-stat refers to the (robust)
F-stat for the Angrist and Pischke weak identification test for log trade with democratic partners (divided by GDP) and its interaction. The
AP F-stats for trade with autocratic partners and its interactions are not reported for brevity. The F-stat for weak IVs is the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald rk statistics for (jointly) weak instruments. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level and are corrected
to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the bilateral trade equation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
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Table 7: Splitting the Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-OECD Initial Democracies From 1960 onward
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
log(integration demo) 1.499** 4.977*** 0.682 -2.365 1.898*** 3.680**
(0.570) (1.418) (0.571) (2.144) (0.537) (1.411)
log(integration auto) -0.790*** -0.828 -0.175 -0.928 -0.669** -0.527
(0.292) (0.717) (0.332) (1.082) (0.277) (0.626)
Observations 856 856 591 591 1,104 1,104
Number of countries 89 89 60 60 116 116
F-stat for weak Ivs 8.464 9.461 7.625
AP F-stat for log(integration demo) 9.709 10.039 9.937
AP F-stat for log(integration auto) 42.559 20.747 48.525
Notes: The dependent variable is Polity2. Columns 1-2 and 3-4 restrict the sample to non-OECD members and to countries with baseline Polity2
score strictly positive, respectively. Columns 5-6 consider only years from 1960 (included) onwards. The main regressors of interest are (log)
trade with democratic and autocratic partners divided by GDP. Actual trade is instrumented with predicted trade as described in the main text
(see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), where democratic (autocratic) partners are defined as partners with Polity2 score five years before strictly positive
(non-positive). All regressions are estimated using 5-year intervals. The sample in columns 1-4 covers the period 1955-2010 (included), the one
in columns 5-6 is for 1960-2010 (included). All regressions include year and country fixed effects. AP F-stat refers to the (robust) F-stat for the
Angrist and Pischke weak identification test for each individual endogenous regressor. The F-stat for weak IVs is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistics for (jointly) weak instruments. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, and the ones for 2SLS are
corrected to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the bilateral trade equation; *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
log(integration demo) 5.021*** 0.775 2.621 2.077
(1.561) (1.775) (1.725) (2.259)
log(integration demo)*(Num. Tel. Lines) -0.504***
(0.121)
log(integration demo)*(Baseline Polity2) -0.870***
(0.148)
log(integration demo)*(RQ polariz Index) -3.349*
(1.709)
log(integration demo)*1(State religion1900) 2.469
(2.242)
Observations 1,049 1,152 1,121 1,152
Number of countries 116 116 112 116
F-stat for weak IV 3.675 4.204 3.791 4.148
AP F-stat for log(integration demo) 6.689 6.228 5.944 7.818
AP F-stat for interaction with log(integration demo) 13.036 20.582 12.393 11.884
Notes: The dependent variable is Polity2. The main regressors of interest are (log) trade with democratic partners
divided by GDP and its interaction with, respectively: i) the number of telephone lines per 100 people at baseline
(column 1); ii) baseline Polity 2 (column 2); iii) the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) index of polarization,
standardised to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1 (column 3); and iv) a dummy for the presence
of state religion in 1900 from Barro and McCleary (2005). Actual trade is instrumented with predicted trade as
described in the main text (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2). All regressions always include the log of trade with autocratic
partners divided by GDP and its interaction with variables (i)-(iv) above (coefficients on these variables not shown
for brevity). Democratic (autocratic) partners are defined as partners with Polity2 score five years before strictly
positive (non-positive). All regressions are estimated on 1955-2010 data at 5-year frequency, and include year and
country fixed effects. AP F-stat refers to the (robust) F-stat for the Angrist and Pischke weak identification test for
log trade with democratic partners (divided by GDP) and its interaction. The AP F-stats for trade with democratic
partners and its interactions are not reported for brevity. The F-stat for weak IVs is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
statistics for (jointly) weak instruments. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level
and are corrected to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the bilateral
trade equation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 1: Change in the Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Air and Sea Distances
(Country-Year and Country-Pair Fixed Effects)
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Notes: Estimated coefficients for specification (2) (also reported in column 1 of Table A2). Error Bars are
plus and minus two standard errors, clustered at the country-pair and year level.
Figure 2: First Stage for Main Specification
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Notes: These graphs correspond to the First Stage regressions reported in column 4, Panels C and D of
Table 2. All variables are partialled out of fixed effects and other regressors. Standard errors are clustered
at the country level and corrected to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated)
parameters of the bilateral trade equation.
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Figure 3: Reduced Form for Main Specification
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Notes: These graphs correspond to the Reduced Form regression for the specification in column 4, Panel
A, of Table 2 (reported in column 2 of Table A3). All variables are partialled out of fixed effects and other
regressors. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and corrected to account for the fact that the
instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the bilateral trade equation.
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Appendix
Table A1: Variables Definition and Sources
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Polity2 Annual democracy score, taking on discrete values from -10 (full autoc-
racy) to 10 (full democracy)
Polity IV Project
dataset
Dpolity Dummy equal to 1 if Polity2> 0, and equal to 0 otherwise Authors’ calculations
Demo FH Dummy equal to 1 if the Freedom Rating is greater or equal than 4.
Freedom Rating is the average of the variables political rights and civil
liberty, both measured on a 1-7 scale, with 7 corresponding to highest
level of freedom (Note that we inverted the original Freedom House scale)
Authors’ calculations
based on Freedom
House data
Trade Sum of annual bilateral trade flows for each country i over all trade part-
ners j for which we have predicted trade from the gravity equation. Bi-
lateral trade flows are calculated as the average of the two trade flows in
merchandise goods from country i to j, and from j to i. These two flows,
in turn, are obtained as the average of the proper directional flows. E.g.,
the flow from i to j is the mean of imports of country j from i and export
of i to j. The latter two figures are usually not identical because of differ-
ences in the exact definition of imports (mostly CIF) and exports (mostly
FOB) and in each country’s reporting. All trade data are measured at
current million US$
Authors’ calcula-
tions from IMF DoT
dataset
GDP Output-side GDP at current million US$ Penn World Table 9.0
rGDP Output-side GDP at chained PPPs in millions of 2005 US$ Penn World Table 9.0
Population Population in the country, in millions Penn World Table 9.0
Integration Trade over GDP Authors’ calculations
Penn World Table 9.0
Integration demo Trade with democratic partners over GDP. Trade with democratic part-
ners is obtained by summing bilateral trade flows with partners whose
Polity2 score is strictly positive and for which we have predicted trade
from the gravity equation.
Authors’ calculations
Integration auto Trade with autocratic partners over GDP. Trade with autocratic partners
is obtained by summing bilateral trade flows with partners whose Polity2
score is negative and for which we have predicted trade from the gravity
equation
Authors’ calculations
Pred integration Predicted trade over GDP. Predicted trade is derived from a gravity equa-
tion as explained in the main text (Section 2.1)
Authors’ calculations
Pred integration
demo
Predicted trade with democracies over GDP. Predicted trade with democ-
racies is derived from a gravity equation as explained in the main text
(Sections 2.1 and 2.3). Democracies are defined with a 5-year lag
Authors’ calculations
Pred integration
auto
Predicted trade with autocracies over GDP. Predicted trade with autoc-
racies is derived from a gravity equation as explained in the main text
(Sections 2.1 and 2.3). Autocracies are defined with a 5-year lag
Authors’ calculations
Air Distance Great circle distances (in km) between the 25 main cities in each country CEPII dataset
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Table A1 Cont’d: Variables Definition and Sources
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Sea Distance Distance between the two main commercial ports for each pair of countries
(in km). See main text for details
Vesseldistance.org
Colonial Tie Dummy equal to 1 if pair of countries ever in colonial relationship CEPII dataset
Common Language Dummy equal to 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population
in both countries
CEPII dataset
Common Border Dummy equal to 1 if pair of countries share a common border. CEPII dataset
Demo wave Share of democracies in each country’s “influence set”. See main text at
Section 3.2.1 and Acemoglu et al. (2015) for details.
Authors’ calculations
based on Acemoglu et
al. (2015)
Percentage of sec-
ondary complete
Fraction of the population with completed secondary schooling Barro and Lee(2013)
Years of schooling Average years of schooling in the population Barro and Lee(2013)
Number of Tele-
phone Lines per
100 People
Number of fixed telephone lines that connect a subscribers terminal equip-
ment to the public switched telephone network and that have a port on
a telephone exchange per people. Measured at baseline
World Bank, World
Development Indica-
tors
State religion Dummy indicator for the presence of state religion in 1900 Barro and McCleary
(2005)
Rq polariz Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) polarization index Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005)
Service exporter Dummy equal to 1 if the country is an exporter of services. Measured at
baseline
World Bank Indica-
tors
Agric. Land Fraction of land devoted to agriculture World Bank Indica-
tors
Industry value
added
Value added from industry. Measured at baseline World Bank Indica-
tors
Agric. value added Value added from agriculture. Measured at baseline World Bank Indica-
tors
Minerals Number of minerals in the country Parker (1997)
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Table A2: Gravity Equation Coefficients
(1) (2)
log(air)x1950 -0.342***
(0.066)
log(air)x1955 0.122*** -0.289***
(0.038) (0.075)
log(air)x1960 0.025 -0.420***
(0.063) (0.065)
log(air)x1965 -0.129* -0.535***
(0.069) (0.065)
log(air)x1970 -0.219*** -0.665***
(0.077) (0.072)
log(air)x1975 -0.325*** -0.836***
(0.079) (0.075)
log(air)x1980 -0.460*** -0.966***
(0.084) (0.082)
log(air)x1985 -0.426*** -0.933***
(0.080) (0.068)
log(air)x1990 -0.438*** -0.937***
(0.078) (0.063)
log(air)x1995 -0.466*** -0.954***
(0.088) (0.064)
log(air)x2000 -0.632*** -1.116***
(0.085) (0.061)
log(air)x2005 -0.759*** -1.264***
(0.086) (0.063)
log(air)x2010 -0.745*** -1.235***
(0.090) (0.063)
log(sea)x1950 -0.395***
(0.063)
log(sea)x1955 -0.079** -0.445***
(0.034) (0.071)
log(sea)x1960 0.027 -0.316***
(0.058) (0.063)
log(sea)x1965 0.114* -0.325***
(0.064) (0.064)
log(sea)x1970 0.014 -0.489***
(0.072) (0.069)
log(sea)x1975 0.058 -0.400***
(0.075) (0.072)
log(sea)x1980 0.095 -0.380***
(0.082) (0.084)
log(sea)x1985 0.010 -0.482***
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Table A2 Cont’d: Gravity Equation Coefficients
(1) (2)
(0.078) (0.069)
log(sea)x1990 -0.043 -0.586***
(0.075) (0.065)
log(sea)x1995 -0.076 -0.662***
(0.085) (0.064)
log(sea)x2000 0.009 -0.590***
(0.082) (0.062)
log(sea)x2005 0.104 -0.482***
(0.082) (0.062)
log(sea)x2010 0.072 -0.539***
(0.087) (0.061)
Observations 369,820 370,101
Notes: The dependent variable is (log) trade. Column 1 reports estimates of equation (2). It includes origin and
destination country-time fixed effects and country-pair fixed effects. Column 2 reports estimates of equation (3).
It includes origin and destination country-time fixed effects, as well as variables for country-pairs sharing a border,
common language or colonial origins. The coefficients of interest are the elasticities with respect to air and sea distance,
which are allowed to vary every 5-year period. Data are annual, and cover the period 1950-2014. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the pair-year level, reported in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A3: Economic Integration and Democracy: Reduced-Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Polity2 Polity2 Polity2 Polity2 Polity2
log(pred integration) 0.714
(0.445)
log(pred integration demo) 1.143** 1.003** 1.208** 1.052***
(0.483) (0.431) (0.480) (0.382)
log(pred integration auto) -0.372 -0.075 -0.512 -0.530*
(0.319) (0.291) (0.318) (0.300)
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
Number of countries 116 116 116 116 116
Notes: Reduced-form regressions corresponding to columns 2 and 4-7 in Table 2. The dependent variable is
Polity2. The main regressors of interest are predicted trade over GDP, considered together in column 1 and
separately for democratic and autocratic partners in columns 2-5. Predicted trade is constructed as described
in the main text (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), where democratic (autocratic) partners are defined as partners with
Polity2 score five years before strictly positive (non-positive). Column 3 controls for demo wave. Columns
4 and 5 include interactions between year dummies and dummies for non-OECD country, and baseline non-
democracy, respectively. All regressions are estimated on 1955-2010 data at 5-year frequency, and include year
and country fixed effects. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level and
corrected to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the bilateral
trade equation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A4: Economic Integration and Democracy: Alternative IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
PANEL A - OLS and SECOND STAGE: dep var is Polity2
log(integration) 1.155** 3.136
(0.558) (2.394)
log(integration demo) 1.693*** 3.843** 2.973 3.149* 2.884*
(0.552) (1.808) (1.802) (1.646) (1.730)
log(integration auto) -0.551** -0.504 0.226 -0.870 -0.886
(0.267) (0.716) (0.629) (0.686) (0.640)
F-stat for weak IVs 13.436 9.215 8.892 10.383 8.949
PANEL B - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration)
log(pred integration) 0.156***
(0.043)
PANEL C - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration demo)
log(pred integration demo) 0.153*** 0.148*** 0.161*** 0.152***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
log(pred integration auto) 0.024 0.029 0.035 0.020
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
AP F-stat for log(integration demo) 10.588 9.710 11.576 10.579
PANEL D - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration auto)
log(pred integration demo) -0.025 -0.030 -0.031 -0.025
(0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
log(pred integration auto) 0.237*** 0.241*** 0.236*** 0.235***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030)
AP F-stat for log(integration auto) 38.076 42.713 31.719 35.623
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192 1,192
Number of countries 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Notes:The dependent variable is reported at the top of each Panel. The main regressor of interest in Panel A is (log) trade over GDP,
considered together in columns 1-2 and separately for democratic and autocratic partners in columns 3-7. Actual trade is instrumented
with predicted trade as described in the main text, relying on the gravity specification (3) (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), where democratic
(autocratic) partners are defined as partners with Polity2 score five years before strictly positive (non-positive). Column 5 controls
for demo wave. Columns 6 and 7 include interactions between year dummies and dummies for non-OECD country, and baseline
non-democracy, respectively. All regressions are estimated on 1950-2010 data at 5-year frequency, and include year and country fixed
effects. AP F-stat refers to the (robust) F-stat for the Angrist and Pischke weak identification test for each individual endogenous
regressor. The F-stat for weak IVs is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk statistics for (jointly) weak instruments. Standard errors (reported
in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, and the ones for 2SLS and First Stages are corrected to account for the fact that the
instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of the bilateral trade equation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A5: Economic Integration and Democracy: Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS ols 2SLS ppml OLS 2SLS ols 2SLS ppml
PANEL A - OLS and SECOND STAGE: dep var is Polity2
log(integration demo) 1.710*** 4.243*** 5.527*** 1.693*** 4.099** 5.567***
(0.550) (1.527) (2.056) (0.552) (1.802) (2.093)
log(integration auto) -0.594** -1.084* -1.385* -0.551** -0.820 -1.162
(0.270) (0.594) (0.763) (0.267) (0.702) (0.785)
F-stat for weak IVs 7.349 4.963 9.515 5.959
PANEL B - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration demo)
log(pred integration demo) 0.290*** 0.286*** 0.158*** 0.198***
(0.068) (0.080) (0.036) (0.053)
log(pred integration auto) -0.033 -0.078 0.023 -0.022
(0.047) (0.064) (0.022) (0.035)
AP F-stat for log(integration demo) 9.221 6.628 10.026 7.219
PANEL C - FIRST STAGE: dep var is log(integration auto)
log(pred integration demo) -0.363*** -0.399*** 0.016 -0.048
(0.111) (0.129) (0.049) (0.086)
log(pred integration auto) 0.617*** 0.661*** 0.253*** 0.339***
(0.063) (0.079) (0.029) (0.042)
AP F-stat for log(integration auto) 52.432 35.350 40.084 33.517
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,192 1,192 1,192
Number of countries 116 116 116 116 116 116
Notes: The dependent variable is reported at the top of each Panel. Columns 1 and 4 are the OLS estimates of (6) over the same
samples as in columns 2-3 and 5-6, respectively. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 report 2SLS estimates where actual trade is instrumented
with predicted trade derived as described in the main text (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), though relying on simplified versions of the
gravity equation (see the end of Section 3.3). In particular, estimates in columns 2-3 are derived from a gravity specification with
distances and fixed effects for country-pair and time. In columns 5 and 6, the gravity equation includes distances, variables for
common border, common language, and common colonial history, plus fixed effects for origin, destination and time. In columns 2
and 5, those gravity equations are estimated with OLS. In columns 3 and 6, with PPML. All regressions are estimated on 1955-2010
data at 5-year frequency, and include country and time fixed effects. AP F-stat refers to the (robust) F-stat for the Angrist and
Pischke weak identification test for each individual endogenous regressor. The F-stat for weak IVs is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald
rk statistics for (jointly) weak instruments. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level, and the
ones in columns 2, 3, and 5 are corrected to account for the fact that the instruments depend on the (estimated) parameters of
the bilateral trade equation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A6: Sample Composition over Time
1955 1960 1970 1980
Mean Polity2 2.896 1.803 -0.478 -0.903
Median Polity2 5 4.5 -2 -5
Num. Countries 48 66 92 103
Num. Baseline Demo 30 34 42 44
Num. Baseline Auto 18 32 50 60
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Table A7: Periods in Main Sample for each Country
Country Time Periods Country Time Periods
ALBANIA 9 KENYA 10
ALGERIA 10 KOREA SOUTH 12
ANGOLA 8 KUWAIT 8
ARGENTINA 12 LATVIA 4
AUSTRALIA 12 LEBANON 6
BAHRAIN 8 LIBERIA 10
BANGLADESH 8 LITHUANIA 4
BELGIUM 3 MADAGASCAR 11
BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG 9 MALAYSIA 9
BENIN 10 MAURITANIA 11
BRAZIL 12 MAURITIUS 9
BULGARIA 9 MEXICO 12
CAMBODIA 7 MOROCCO 11
CAMEROON 11 MOZAMBIQUE 8
CANADA 12 MYANMAR 10
CAPE VERDE 8 NAMIBIA 5
CHILE 12 NETHERLANDS 12
CHINA 12 NEW ZEALAND 12
COLOMBIA 12 NICARAGUA 12
COMOROS 8 NIGERIA 11
CONGO 10 NORWAY 12
COSTA RICA 12 OMAN 9
CROATIA 4 PAKISTAN 12
CYPRUS 11 PANAMA 12
DEM REP CONGO 11 PERU 12
DENMARK 12 PHILIPPINES 12
DJIBOUTI 7 POLAND 9
DOMINICAN REP 12 PORTUGAL 12
ECUADOR 12 QATAR 8
EGYPT 12 ROMANIA 11
EL SALVADOR 12 RUSSIA 4
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 9 SAUDI ARABIA 9
ESTONIA 4 SENEGAL 11
FIJI 9 SERBIA 4
FINLAND 12 SIERRA LEONE 10
FRANCE 12 SINGAPORE 10
GABON 11 SLOVENIA 4
GAMBIA 10 SOUTH AFRICA 12
GEORGIA 4 SPAIN 12
GERMANY 12 SRI LANKA 12
GHANA 11 SUDAN 9
GREECE 12 SURINAME 8
GUATEMALA 12 SWEDEN 12
GUINEA 11 SYRIA 10
GUINEA-BISSAU 8 TANZANIA 10
HAITI 11 THAILAND 12
HONDURAS 12 TOGO 10
INDIA 12 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 10
INDONESIA 11 TUNISIA 11
IRAN 12 TURKEY 12
IRAQ 8 UKRAINE 4
IRELAND 12 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 8
ISRAEL 12 UNITED KINGDOM 12
ITALY 12 UNITED STATES 12
IVORY COAST 11 URUGUAY 12
JAMAICA 11 VENEZUELA 12
JAPAN 12 VIETNAM 7
JORDAN 12 YEMEN 5
Notes: Number of 5-year periods, from 1955 to 2010 (included) in which a country is included in the sample of Table 2.
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Figure A1: Change in the Elasticity of Trade with Respect to Air and Sea Distances
(Country-Year Fixed Effects and Bilateral Controls)
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Air Sea
Notes: Estimated coefficients in specification (3) (also reported in column 2 of Table A2). Error Bars are
plus and minus two standard errors, clustered at the country-pair and year level.
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